Abstract. A weak pseudorandom function (wPRF) is a pseudorandom functions with a relaxed security requirement, where one only requires the output to be pseudorandom when queried on random (and not adversarially chosen) inputs. We show that unlike standard PRFs, wPRFs are secure against memory attacks, that is they remain secure even if a bounded amount of information about the secret key is leaked to the adversary. As an application of this result we propose a simple mode of operation which -when instantiated with any wPRF -gives a leakage-resilient stream-cipher. Such a cipher is secure against any side-channel attack, as long as the amount of information leaked per round is bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large. This construction is simpler than the only previous one (Dziembowski-Pietrzak FOCS'08) as it only uses a single primitive (a wPRF) in a straight forward manner.
Introduction
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are designed to withstand adversaries that can attack the cryptosystem in a black-box fashion. This means that all the adversary can do is to query the system at hand according to the security definition. Unfortunately, this model does not capture many attacks in the real-world where adversaries can attack concrete implementations of cryptosystems which potentially leak information about their internal secret. Attacks exploiting such leakage are called side-channel attacks. In the last two decades we saw many cryptanalytic attacks exploiting side-channels as running-time [38] , electromagnetic radiation [46, 23] or power consumption [40] . A recent example [20] is the side-channel attack against KeeLoq (which refers to the "KeeLoq blockcipher" and some particular mode in which this cipher is used), which is widely used as anti-theft mechanisms for cars. Although the KeeLoq block-cipher is not very secure to start with [10, 32] , the devastating side-channel attack of [20] exploits a weakness in the mode in which the cipher is used, rather than a weakness in the cipher itself, and it would still be applicable even if the KeeLoq block-cipher was replaced with a strong block-cipher, say AES ( [20] Talk of Christof Paar). It is thus an intriguing question whether there exist modes of operation which are provably secure against a wide class of side-channel attacks if instantiated with any block-cipher.
In this paper we answer this question affirmatively and propose a mode of operation (cf. Figure 1 ) which turns any weak PRF into a stream-cipher which is provably secure against all side-channel attacks, assuming only that the amount of leakage in each round is bounded, and that the leakage can be computed given the entire memory content of the stream-cipher that is accessed in this round. Such a "leakage-resilient" cipher was recently constructed in [19] , the main advantage of our new construction is its simplicity, it can be instantiated with any weak PRF (e.g. with a block-cipher like AES), whereas the construction from [19] additionally required extractors.
The simplicity of the construction (as compared to [19] ) comes at the price of a more involved security proof. Besides the technical tools we introduced in [19] , we will need new results concerning the security of weak PRFs when neither the key nor the inputs are uniform. The idea underlying the proof also applies to other primitives like for encryption schemes (cf. last two paragraphs in §3.1 of [1] ).
⋆ An extended abstract of this paper appeared at Eurocrypt 2009
Why Leakage-Resilience. Leakage-resilience is an extremely strong security notion considering adversaries who can choose arbitrary leakage functions. To practitioners this may seem like an overkill, after all, why consider unrealistic side-channels which leak some very involved function of the state instead of using some ad-hoc countermeasures against "real" side-channels? A lesson cryptographers have learned in the last decades is that ad-hoc arguments usually result in insecure systems, and this very much applies to the young history of side-channel cryptanalysis. Implementing cryptographic algorithms in a straight forward way will almost certainly make them very susceptible to side-channel attacks. Often -like in differential power analysis [40, 9] -such attacks will learn a little bit of information in each evaluation, and then combine this information to get the secret key. Thus it is crucial that an implementation does not leak even small amounts of (useful) information. In contrast, "leakage-resilient" algorithms as considered in this work guarantee security even if in each invocation a bounded amount of arbitrary information is leaked.
We advocate the following approach to the design and construction of cryptodevices which must withstand side-channel attacks: first cryptographers design a leakage-resilient algorithm C, with the guarantee that whenever you implement C such that in each invocation ≤ λ bits of information leak, the implementation is safe. This still leaves the task of implementing C such that the ≤ λ leakage bound is met. 1 The rationale here is that this task is clearly much more realistic than having to implement an algorithm such that absolutely nothing leaks at all, as it would be necessary if the algorithm would come with no bound on the leakage that can be tolerated. (cf. Kocher [39] for a similar argument). This modular approach has the advantage that cryptographers can design schemes without requiring any background on practical aspects of real-word side-channel attacks. Similarly, engineers can design hardware which should satisfy some upper bound on the amount of information it leaks without having to understand or even know what the actually algorithms will be.
Some Related Work. Most papers on side-channel security -like [38, 46, 23, 40, 5, 4] mentioned in the introduction -consider attacks and/or countermeasures against a specific side-channel.
Physically Observable
Cryptography. An early paper considering general models for side-channel attacks is the work of Micali and Reyzin [42] on "physically observable cryptography". This work is particularly insightful for cryptographers as unlike most work on this topic it is written in a language accessible to theoreticians. [42] propose a concrete mathematical model for side-channel attacks which is based on five "axioms", some of which also come up more or less explicitly in the "leakage-resilient" model. Private Circuits. Ishai et al. [34, 33] consider a model model where the adversary can choose some wires in the circuit on which the cryptographic algorithm is run, and then learns the values carried by those wires during the computation (This can be seen as a generalization to exposure resilient cryptography [13] , where the adversary was restricted to learn some bits of the input.) What makes their work exceptional is that they prove how to implement any algorithm secure against an interesting side-channel (i.e. probing attacks.
2 Recently Faust et al. [22] extended this to any leakage function from low complexity classes like AC 0 .
The drawback of those general compilers is that they are based on (albeit very simple) completely leakage-proof modules, and that the amount of leakage that can be tolerated is very small: to tolerate t bits leakage, the circuits must be blown up by a factor of at least t (whereas e.g. in the setting of exposure-resilience, memory attacks or leakage-resilience the amount is usually a constant fraction of some secret state).
Memory Attacks.
A cryptographic scheme is secure against memory attacks, if it remains secure even if a bounded amount of information about the secret key is given to the adversary. In this model [1, 43] have constructed symmetric/public-key encryption schemes and [35, 2] constructed signature schemes.
Unlike leakage-resilience, security against memory attacks does not require the "modular leakage" restriction (which we'll discuss in detail later). On the downside, it is a "one-shot" game where the total amount of leakage cannot be larger than the length of the secret key (recall that leakageresilience only requires that the amount leaked per invocation is bounded and overall can be arbitrary large.) Schemes that are secure against memory attacks have been used as building blocks for leakageresilient schemes, in particular in [21] we construct leakage-resilient signature schemes from the schemes in [35, 2] and in this paper we construct a leakage-resilient stream cipher from wPRFs, which as we prove are always secure against memory attacks.
Auxiliary Input. Dodis et al. [12] construct a symmetric encryption scheme which remains secure given some leakage f (K) about the secret key. Unlike in memory attacks no bound on the length of |f (K)| is put, but one only requires that f (.) is an exponentially hard one-way function. This is remarkable, as being one-way (albeit not necessarily exponentially hard one-way) is already a necessary condition on the leakage function in order to prove any kind of security.
Stream-Ciphers.
Other papers that consider constructions of stream-ciphers which withstand sidechannel attacks include [39, 42, 44] . Kocher [39] considers a very simple construction where one simply iterates a hash function (SHA256 is suggested). This work is kept informal, with no proofs or even formal claims, but contains several interesting conceptual ideas. Micali and Reyzin [42] investigate reductions of side-channel resistant primitives, in particular they show that the BlumMicali construction is secure, assuming the implementation of the underlying permutation already satisfies some strong form of side-channel security. The work which aims at a goal most similar to ours and [19] is Petit et al. [44] . They propose and analyze a block-cipher based construction, where security against sides-channels is achieved by making it hard to "combine" leakages from different rounds.
3 Their underlying model [48] is motivated by practical considerations, considering leakagefunctions and attacks that have been successfully used to break systems. Compared to [44] , we take a much more theoretical approach, our setting is more general and the underlying assumptions are weaker in several aspects. In particular against arbitrary leakage functions as considered in this work, even if the underlying primitives are ideal (e.g. Random oracles in [39] or ideal ciphers in [44] ) and only one bit of information leaks per invocation of the underlying primitive. (but this does by no means mean that they are insecure against side-channels that arise in practice.) 4 Leakage-Resilient PRFs. The problem of constructing leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions and permutations (i.e. block-ciphers) is still open. Unfortunately standard cryptographic reductions, like the GGM construction of PRFs form PRGs [26] , do in general not preserve leakage-resilience, thus a leakage-resilient stream cipher does not imply a leakage-resilient PRF. Some results in weaker models and under idealized assumption are known. In particular Standeart et al. [49] consider a relaxation of leakage-resilience where the leakage function is fixed (and not adaptively chosen), they show that in this model the GGM construction actually is secure (additionally assuming that the underlying PRG is a random oracle and the leakage function cannot access the random oracle.) In [37] we construct a leakage-resilient weak PRF in the generic group model.
Related Models. Some interesting recent results in settings which are similar or otherwise relevant to general models of side-channel security include [6] , who show how to securely realize protocols when perfect deletion is not possible. Goldwasser et al. [27] construct "one-time programs" from simple hardware satisfying some weak form of side-channel security. Dodis and Wichs [14] solve the long standing open problem of two round (i.e. round-optimal) authenticated key-agreement from non-uniform keys.
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
In this section we informally introduce and motivate the model of "leakage-resilient cryptography" from [19] .
Consider some keyed cryptographic primitive CP. The most general side-channel attack against CP(S 0 ) -where S 0 denotes the secret initial state -is to allow an attacker to choose any leakage function f , which then is evaluated on the initial state S 0 , and the adversary receives f (S 0 ). Here the leakage function is applied only to the state S 0 , and not to any internal variables appearing in the computation. This can be done without loss of generality as all the internal variables are simply functions of the state S 0 , and thus can be computed by f . Clearly we cannot hope for any security at all when allowing any f , as f could simply output the complete state f (S 0 ) = S 0 . Thus, it is necessary to somehow restrict the range or computational power of the leakage function. We will restrict the range of admissible leakage functions to {0, 1} λ , where λ ≪ |S 0 | is some parameter. This model is inspired by the bounded-retrieval model [11, 16, 15, 7, 18] , which in turn was inspired by the bounded-storage model [41, 17, 51] .
As the implementation of any cryptosystem will leak more information the longer it runs, we want to allow the attacker A to adaptively choose different leakage functions during the lifetime of the system. For this, we assume that CP runs in rounds (where a "round" is just some well defined part of the computation), and denote with S i the state of CP after round i (to simplify the exposition we assume that the size of the state remains constant).
The attacker A we consider can adaptively choose a leakage function f i before the ith round, and after round i receives f i (S i−1 ), i.e. the leakage function evaluated on the state at the beginning of round i. Unfortunately, by just restricting the range of the leakage functions to λ bits, no security is possible beyond round t, where t · λ ≥ |S 0 |, as A can simply define the f i 's such that f i (S i−1 ) will be some λ bits of S t . (note that for i ≤ t, f i can compute the future state S t from its input S i−1 .) After round t the attacker A has learned the entire state S t , and no security is possible beyond this point.
Thus if we want security even after (much) more than |S 0 | bits have leaked, we need to further restrict the leakage functions. We will do this by restricting also the domain of the leakage functions: f i does not get the entire secret state S i as input, but only the part S + i ⊆ S i that is actually accessed by CP in the ith round. We will refer to this restriction as "modular leakage".
On "modular leakage". As a special important case the "modular leakage" restriction covers all side-channel attacks against physical devices which adhere the "only computation leaks information" axiom from [42] . Roughly, this axiom states that the information measured by an adversary only depends on the computation that is just going on, and in particular is independent of any storage that is not accessed. (cf. [42] for a more detailed discussion.)
In the conference version of this paper we actually referred to "modular leakage" as "only computation leaks information", but this generated some confusion, and several claims were made in the literature that the restriction would exclude attacks like cold boot attacks [28] or static leakage (as claimed in [49] ). Although it is true that those attacks do not necessarily adhere the physical assumption that "only computation leaks information", they are well captured by the "modular leakage" model. To give a trivial example, consider cold-boot attacks, here the adversary leans a random subset of the bits of the secret state S which is stored on the memory. Assume that (as it is the case in this work) at time-point t where the cold-boot attack is mounted, the secret state S consists of two parts S ′ and S ′′ which have been accessed (individually) before time t. Thus in the "modular leakage" model learning a subset of S can be captured by choosing leakage functions
The fact that a cold-boot attack is mounted at a time-point where no computation takes place is irrelevant.
On Efficient Leakage Functions. As we consider a computational primitive, and the total leakage can be larger than the entire state, we can only allow efficient leakage functions, as otherwise the leakage function itself could be used to break the computation assumption (even completely ignoring its input.) This is not explicitly stated, but naturally comes up in the model where the main result (Theorem 2) puts an upper bound on the size of a circuit computing the entire random experiment in which the cipher is attacked.
On (non)-Uniformity. Throughout, we always consider non-uniform adversaries. 5 In particular, our main reduction is non-uniform, which means we prove that if an adversary exists who breaks the stream-cipher, then an adversary (of related complexity) exists who breaks the underlying weak PRF. One step in the proof where we need non-uniformity is a lemma from [3] which relates two types of pseudoentropy notions. As [3] also prove this lemma in a uniform setting (albeit which much worse parameters), it might be possible (though we didn't check the details) to make our entire reduction uniform, that is to show how to efficiently construct an adversary against the weak PRF from any adversary against the stream-cipher. (we refer to Goldreich's article [24] as to why such a reduction is desirable.)
On Bounded Leakage. As described in the previous section, in each round we allow the adversary to choose any function f with range {0, 1} λ , and she then learns the leakage f (S), where S is the state accessed in this round.
We use this model as it is very clear and simple to work with, but in the proof we actually need the much weaker restriction that the leakage does not contain more than λ bits of "useful" information. Formally, we only require that in each invocation the HILL-pseudoentropy which the adversary has about the secret internal state does not drop by much more than λ bits when given the leakage.
Weak PRFs with Non-Uniform Keys and Inputs
As main new technical tools we prove bounds on the security of weak pseudorandom functions (wPRF) when the key and/or the inputs are not uniformly random.
Recall that the security notion for a pseudorandom function (PRF)
requires that no efficient distinguisher can tell apart F(k, .) from a uniformly random function if the key k ∈ {0, 1} κ is sampled at random. Here the adversary can choose on which inputs to query F(k, .). Weak PRFs are defined similarly, but the security requirement is relaxed: F is a wPRF, if F(k, .) cannot be distinguished from random, if queried on random inputs. Thus an adversary gets to see X 1 , . . . , X q and Z 1 , . . . , Z q , and then must guess whether
where R is a uniformly random function.
What can we say about the security of (weak) PRFs when we leak arbitrary λ bits of information f (K) about the secret key? The security of PRFs is completely broken already for λ = 1: e.g. given the first bit of F(k, X) (for any fixed X) we can distinguish F(k, .) from random with advantage 1/2 by simply querying on input X (if the first bit of the output is not what the leakage said, we know for sure that we're querying the random function.) Halevi et al. [29] show a negative result even for a weaker notion.
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Unlike for normal PRFs, for wPRFs it is not clear if and how some leakage f (K) can help the distinguisher, e.g. now simply setting f (k) to denote the λ first bits of F(k, X) for some fixed input X will not trivially break the security of F(k, .) as here the adversary cannot choose the inputs X for which she gets to see F(k, X). In fact, we show that one can leak information f (k) about the key of any weak PRF without breaking its security. Of course by leaking λ bits of the key, we must tolerate some security loss (at least for general wPRFs). In particular, if we use the trivial attack just described (leaking λ bits of F(k, X)), the adversary can get "lucky", and one of theueries X 1 , . . . , X q will hit the fixed input X. Because of that, the adversary has some extra advantage of roughly q/2 n (compared to an adversary not getting f (k)). Further, if we assume that the best attack against F is brute-force search over the keyspace, then leaking λ bits of the key will degrade the security by a factor of 2 λ . As we prove in Lemma 2, it doesn't get much worse than that: if F(k, .) cannot be distinguished with advantage more than ǫ, then the advantage (against somewhat smaller adversaries) is still bounded by roughly 2 λ (ǫ + q 2 /2 n+1 ) (here we set t from Lemma 2 to n, and assume that n is large enough so that the last term in (4) can be ignored.)
We actually do not consider the setting where the key k is random, and then f (k), |f (k)| = λ is leaked, but the more general case where k is sampled from some distribution with min-entropy at least |k| − λ, and we need this more general case later when proving the security of the leakage-resilient stream-cipher. Assuming only min-entropy is more general as for any function f and uniformly random k, k has still (expected) min-entropy at least |k| − λ given f (k).
We also prove a similar result (Lemma 3) concerning the security of wPRFs assuming the inputs (as opposed to the key) are not uniformly random.
Proof Sketch. We will now sketch the proof that any wPRF is secure even when the secret key is only sampled from some distribution with min-entropy |k| − λ by a (uniform) reduction (the formal statement and full proof is given in Section 4.) Assume an adversary A can distinguish F(k, .) (where k is from any distribution with min-entropy |k| − λ) from a random function with advantage ǫ ′ when given q random inputs and the corresponding outputs. Using the Markov bound one can show that this implies that a key k sampled from the above distribution is "weak" with probability at least ǫ ′ /2, where a key k is said to be weak, if the distinguishing advantage of A, conditioned on the key being k, is at least ǫ ′ /2. If k is now sampled from the uniform distribution (and not a distribution with min-entropy |k| − λ), then k will be weak with probability at least ǫ ′ /2 λ+1 , i.e. we loose at most a factor 2 λ . The proof is based on the fact that by observing the output of a function g(.) on sufficiently many random inputs, then (using the Hoeffiding bound) one can almost certainly distinguish the cases where g(.) is F(k, .) for a weak k and the case where g(.) is a random oracle, as by definition of a weak key, the probability of A outputting 1 differs by at least ǫ ′ /2 for both cases. Now we can sample A's decision bit Ω(1/ǫ ′ ) times to distinguish this two cases. In the above argument it is important that in the case where g(.) is a random oracle, we can sample many independent guess bits of A. This will be almost the case assuming the range of F from which the random inputs are sampled is large enough, so all the inputs will be distinct w.h.p.. When considering "normal" PRFs, we can't sample independent decision bits like this as here the adversary A can simply query g(.) on some fixed set of inputs, and thus its guess bits will be always identical. This is the point in the proof where we exploit the fact that we consider weak PRFs.
On Security Degradation. The major difference between the results in [1, 43, 35, 2] (showing that particular constructions of encryption and signing schemes are secure against memory attacks) and our result for any wPRF is that the former do basically not loose any security, even if lots of information about the secret key sk is leaked (usually some c|sk| bits for a constant 0 < c < 1). Whereas we only can show that the security of a wPRF degrades by at most 2 λ when leaking λ bits. This is unfortunate, but for general wPRFs one cannot hope to prove anything better (just consider a wPRF where brute-force key search is the best attack, then clearly leaking λ bits will degrade the security by 2 λ .) Moreover, even if we had particular constructions of wPRFs which are secure against memory attacks (without any security degradation), it is not clear how one could use it to construct a leakage-resilient stream cipher which does not suffer from exponential security degradation. (in contrast, for signatures schemes a security preserving reduction from memory-attacks to leakage resilience is possible [21] .)
As wPRFs are symmetric primitives, this exponential degradation is not so serious as it would be with, say, public-key encryption. The reason is that for block-ciphers (which are pseudorandom permutations, and thus wPRFs) one usually does make exponential hardness assumptions anyway. For example a block-cipher with key-length k considered broken if it can be broken in time ≪ 2 k . Thus assuming a block-cipher family (indexed by the key length k) which for some c > 0 cannot be broken in time 2
ck , we get a leakage-resilient stream-cipher where on each invocation the amount of leakage can be of size linear in the size of the entire secret state.
Applications
The unpredictability and indistinguishability based notions used in this paper are basically the best one can achieve in the general leakage model we consider. A stream cipher satisfying them is sufficient to realize important tasks like (stateful) leakage-resilient symmetric authentication and encryption. For authentication it is sufficient that the secret X i used is unpredictable, thus here we can allow the adversary to observe the leakage in the round where X i is computed. For semantically secure encryption, e.g. when using a one-time pad C = M ⊕ X i , we need X i to be indistinguishable, thus here the adversary cannot get the leakage in round i, but can so for all other rounds j < i and j > i (the latter as we achieve forward security.)
Notation
For a set X , we denote with X * ← X that X is assigned a value sampled uniformly at random from X . To save on notation, we write X i to denote a sequence X 1 , . . . , X i . R n,m denotes a uniformly random function {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , R n denotes R n,n .
Outline
In Section 2 we revisit the notion of a leakage-resilient stream-cipher from [19] . We define our new mode of operation, and state the main Theorem 2 which says that this mode gives a leakage-resilient stream-cipher if instantiated with any wPRF. In Section 3 we first prove (using a standard hybrid argument) the security of or stream-cipher in the classical sense, i.e. not assuming any leakage. Proving the security of our stream cipher in the presence of leakage is much more challenging. A main ingredient for this proof are the results from Section 4, where we prove that weak PRFs remain secure even if the key and/or the inputs are not uniform. In Section 5 we finally prove Theorem 2 using the results from Sections 4, and some technical results from [19] . κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} κ+n . The main result of this paper is a proof that this modes is a leakage-resilient stream cipher if instantiated with any weak PRF.
Below we first formally define this construction, and then state a Theorem which bounds the security of S F as a normal stream-cipher. We then define what a leakage-resilient stream-cipher is. Then we state our main theorem (Theorem 2) which bounds the security of S F as a leakage-resilient stream-cipher in terms of the security of F as a weak PRF.
The Construction: Let F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} κ+n be a function. Then, with S F we denote the following mode of operation
κ and X 0 * ← {0, 1} n . Only K 0 , K 1 must be secret, X 0 can be public. State: The state before the ith round is
and outputs X i . Then the state
not accessed in the ith round).
Security of S without Side-Channels: Theorem 1 below states that the output of S F is pseudorandom (i.e. is a secure stream-cipher in the "classical" sense) if F is a secure weak pseudorandom function. The proof of this theorems follows by a straight forward hybrid argument and is given in Section 3. The security of S F is stated in terms of the security of F as a weak pseudorandom function (wPRF), which is defined like a normal PRF except that the inputs are random and not adversarially chosen. 
κ+n is a (ǫ prf , s prf , 1) secure wPRF, then for any ℓ ∈ N, no adversary of size s prf − ℓ · |F| can distinguish the first ℓ + 1 blocks as output by S F from uniformly random with advantage more than ℓ · ǫ prf .
Side-Channel Adversary: As outlined in Section 1.1, we consider an adversary A who can attack S F by choosing any function f i : {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} λ before round i, and at the end of the round receives the normal output X i of S F and also the leakage Λ i def = f i (K i−1 ). In round i, S F (S i−1 ) only access K i−1 and X i−1 , thus giving K i−1 as input to f i means that f i can use the entire state that S F accesses in round i. Note that we don't have to explicitly give X i−1 as input to f i , as A must only decide on f i after she got X i−1 and thus can hard-code it into f i . We denote with A λ the set of adversaries as just described which choose leakage functions with range {0, 1}
λ .
Leakage-Resilient Security Notion: Let view ℓ denote the view of the adversary after X ℓ has been computed, i.e.
With view − ℓ = view ℓ \ X ℓ we denote view ℓ but without the last output X ℓ . The security notion we consider requires that X ℓ+1 is indistinguishable from random, even when given view ℓ (which will imply that it is unpredictable given view 
Security of S against Side-Channel Attacks: The security of S F will depend on the security of F as a weak pseudorandom function. Recall that the complexity of a non-uniform adversary is captured by the size of a circuit describing it. For a circuit D, we let size(D) denote its size. We will also write size(S ℓ−1 A) to denote the size of a circuit needed to implement the entire random experiment S ℓ−1 A, as illustrated in Figure 1 , where eval denotes a circuit which on input the description of a function f : {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} λ and K ∈ {0, 1} κ computes and outputs f (K).
Theorem 2 (Security with Leakage) Let F : {0, 1} κ ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} κ+n be a (ǫ prf , s prf , n/ǫ prf )-secure wPRF where ǫ prf ≥ n · 2 −n/3 and n ≥ 20. Let λ = log(ǫ 
On λ: Note that the amount of leakage λ = log(ǫ −1 prf )/6 we tolerate depends on the hardness of the underlying wPRF. Thus if F is secure against adversaries of super-polynomial size, i.e. ǫ prf = 2 ω(log κ) , then the amount of leakage is at least super-logarithmic λ = ω(log κ). This already covers many practical attacks like Hamming weight attacks (see e.g. [36] ).
If F is exponentially hard, i.e. ǫ prf = 2 −Ω(κ) , then λ = Ω(κ), and thus we can even leak a constant fraction of the internal state in each round.
Unpredictability: Theorem 2 states that when given the view of an adversary A who attacked S for ℓ−1 rounds, the next value X ℓ to be computed is indistinguishable from random. If the adversary is also given Λ ℓ = f ℓ (K ℓ−1 ) (i.e. the leakage computed in round ℓ), X ℓ cannot be pseudorandom any more, as Λ ℓ could e.g. be the λ first bits of X ℓ . In the case where Λ ℓ is also leaked, one can still prove (using Lemma 4) that X ℓ is unpredictable: for any δ > 0, with probability 1 − δ the random variable X ℓ has n − λ − log(δ −1 ) bits of "HILL-pseudoentropy" (a notion to be defined in Section 5).
Forward Security: Like the construction from [19] , also S F is forward secure: Theorem 2 holds even for a stronger security notion than AdvInd, where the distinguisher D is additionally given entire state of S F after round ℓ + 1.
Instantiation with a block-cipher: Our construction requires a wPRF F :
κ+n . Such an F can be constructed from any secure block-cipher BC : {0, 1} κ ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n like AES. (AES comes with different security parameters κ = n = 128 and κ = n = 256). For this we have to do some range expansion, e.g. by setting ( denotes concatenation)
Here
2n is a secure PRF (and thus wPRF) assuming that BC :
n is a pseudorandom permutation, which is the standard security notion for block-ciphers. 7 
Proof of Theorem 1: Security of S without Side-Channels
In this section we prove Theorem 1. Assume there exists an adversary A who distinguishes a random string of length ℓ · n from the pseudorandom string X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X ℓ as computed by S
n ) with advantage > ǫ. From this A, we will construct an adversaryÃ who can distinguish the output of F (for a single query) from random with advantage ǫ/ℓ. We will use a standard hybrid argument (cf. [25] ).
For i = 0, . . . , ℓ, we define hybrid distributions H i ∈ {0, 1} ℓ·n as follows:
Note that H 0 = Z 0 , . . . , Z ℓ has exactly the same distribution as X 0 , . . . , X ℓ , and H ℓ is uniformly random, so by our assumption on A
and thus there exists a w, 0 ≤ w < ℓ such that
Now consider an adversaryÃ who on input X ∈ {0, 1} n , Y ∈ {0, 1} κ+n samples Z 0 , . . . , Z ℓ , such that they have distribution H w+1 if X, Y are uniformly random, but distribution H w if Y = F(K, X) for a random K (below we show how this is done). ThenÃ simply invokes A on input Z 0 , . . . , Z ℓ . Thus it directly follows from (3) that for
And thus F is not a (ǫ/ℓ, |Ã|, 1) secure wPRF. A samples Z 0 , . . . , Z ℓ (which will have distribution H w or H w+1 , depending of whether Y is uniform or Y = F(K, X)) as follows:
κ and for j = 0, . . . , w − 1 sample Z j * ← {0, 1} n . -Set Z w := X and parse Y = K w+2 X w+1 .
The size ofÃ is |A| plus the size used for the sampling, which is at most ℓ · |F|.
wPRF with Non-Uniform Keys and Inputs
We will need the following classical technical lemma several times.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding's inequality [31] ) Let X 1 , . . . , X t be independent random variables where
Then, for the sum of these variables X = X 1 + · · · + X t we have the inequality:
Recall that a random variable Z has min-entropy k, denoted H ∞ (Z) = k, if for all z in the range of
Definition 2 (wPRF with non-uniform keys and inputs) We call a function
F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m a (ǫ prf , s prf , q prf )
-secure wPRF with α-low keys, if it's a wPRF as in Definition 1 even if the key K comes from any distribution with min-entropy κ − α (instead of being uniformly random).
Similarly, we say F is a (ǫ prf , s prf , q prf )-secure wPRF with β-low inputs, if it's a wPRF as in Definition 1, except that the inputs X i come from any distribution with min-entropy m − β.
Non-Uniform Keys. By the following lemma, every wPRF (using uniform keys) is a wPRF for α-low keys. The loss in security is roughly 2 α+1 , which for general wPRFs is basically optimal.
Lemma 2 For any α > 0 and t ∈ N:
secure wPRF with α-low keys if the following holds
As ǫ ′ prf appears twice in eq.(4), we cannot easily express ǫ ′ prf as a function of ǫ prf . One can get a closed expression at the price of a worse bound by e.g. replacing ǫ ′ prf in (4) with ǫ prf , one then gets (for t ∈ N of our choice): q
Proof
where ξ k denotes A's advantage conditioned on the key being k, i.e. with
κ denote the set of all weak keys. From (5) we get by Markov
κ . We define an event E whose probability only depends on the value of k as Pr
Then the probability of E is
and further, conditioned on E, K has the same distribution as K α
With this we can lower bound the probability that the uniformly random key K is weak as
Next, we will construct an adversaryÃ which can almost perfectly distinguish the outputs of a random function from the outputs of F when used with any weak key. More precisely, let
will almost always output 0, whereasÃ(X q prf , Y q prf ) will almost always output 1 if k ∈ K. SoÃ will break the security of F as a weak PRF with advantage at least
where the probability if over the choice of the X i * ← {0, 1} n , the random function R n,m used to compute R i = R n,m (X i ) and the random coins used by A (if any). The adversaryÃ on input X q prf , Z q prf is defined as follows:
-Split the input in t equal parts which we denote (X 1 ,Ẑ 1 ), . . . , (X t ,Ẑ t ) (so e.g.
.
prf /4 thenÃ outputs 0, otherwise she outputs 1.
By the following two claims,Ã will almost never output 1 if the Z i are random, but will output 1 with probability almost ǫ prf /2 α+1 if the the Z i were computed by F.
Proof. By definitionÃ will output 1 iff (T − t · φ) > t · ǫ ′ prf /4. In the case where the Z i are computed as R n,m (X i ) (as it is the case for the R i in this claim) we have by eq. (7) 
Let T ′ 1 , . . . , T ′ t be independent binary random variables, where for j = 1, . . . , t the T j is sampled by choosing a uniformly random function R j : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m and (for i = 1, . . . , q
As the T ′ j 's are independent, we can use Hoeffding's inequality (Lemma 1) to upper bound
This bound does not apply to (8) , as unlike the T ′ j , the T j are not completely independent, as we use the same random function R n,m for each T j . We will show that this is not a big problem if the domain is large enough, as conditioned on all the X i 's being different, the R i 's will have the same distribution in the computation of the T j and T ′ j ; Let E denote the event, which holds if all the q prf = q ′ prf · t values X j,i (sampled to compute T or T ′ ) are pairwise distinct. As those values are all sampled independently and uniformly from {0, 1} n , by the birthday bound
Conditioned on E, the distribution of the T i 's and T ′ i (and thus of T and T ′ ) is identical, in particular
The claim now follows from (8)-(11).
Claim 2 Let K * ← {0, 1} κ and for i = 1, . . . , q prf :
Proof. We have
By (6) we can lower bound the first term on the right side in (12) as
It remains to upper bound the second term. For this recall thatÃ outputs 0 if |T − t · φ| > t · ǫ ′ prf /4, where T = t j=1 T j and each T j is the output of A(X
, and thusÃ will only output 0, if the value of T is bounded away by at least t · ǫ ′ prf /4 from its expectation, again using the Hoeffding bound
The claim follows from this equation and (12), (13) .
The bound onÃ's advantage ǫ prf as claimed in the lemma follows from the two claims above. The bound on the size s prf and number of queries q prf made byÃ follows directly from the definition of A.
Non-Uniform Inputs
We just showed that a wPRF stays secure even if the key is not uniform. We will now prove a similar result for the case where the inputs are not uniformly random. We only consider the case where the adversary gets a single input/output pair. 
-secure wPRF for β-low input, thus there exists an adversary A of size s ′ prf and a random variable X β ∈ {0, 1} m with min-entropy
Let φ(x) be A's advantage, conditioned on the input being x, i.e.
Assume we could compute a function τ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} where
With (14) this implies
With an argument similar to (6) this implies for uniform X
Thus if we could efficiently compute a function τ as above, this would immediately give a ǫ ′ prf /2 β+1 -distinguisher for the distributions (X, F(K, X)) and (X, R). Our distinguisherÃ defined below, will get a very good approximation of τ (x) by sampling.
A(x, y) (where x is uniform and y is either F(K, x) or a random) is defined as follows.
1. For i = 1, . . . , t sample random keys
By definition, the expectation of each T i is E[T i ] = φ(x), and moreover the T i are independent. So if
, we can upper bound this using Hoeffding's inequality as
Thus the τ computed byÃ satisfies (15) except with exponentially small probability, i.e. twice (17) . ThusÃ advantage is as in (16) minus twice (17) , as claimed in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2
We will prove the security of S F (cf. Figure 1 ) by proving that if the state X i−1 , K i−1 accessed in round i is independent and has HILL-pseudoentropy n − 2λ and κ − 2λ, respectively, then also the output X i , K i+1 has such a HILL-pseudoentropy given the leakage Λ i = f (X i−1 , K i−1 ) (Lemma 7). Though we unavoidably get some degradation in the "quality" of the pseudoentropy (in terms of ǫ, s in Definition 3 below), this degradation is only additive, and thus we can sum it up over all rounds.
This summation to bound the degradation in security is quite tedious. It might seem that one could get a much simpler proof using a hybrid argument, where for the jth hybrid one would simply replace the output in the first j rounds (having high HILL-pseudoentropy) with some (indistinguishable) output having high min-entropy. Unfortunately we can't make this intuition work, the reason is that high HILL-pseudoentropy only implies existence of an indistinguishable random variable with high min-entropy, but gives no means as to how to sample it. Thus it is not clear how to efficiently sample the hybrids just described. 
Definition 4 (PRG)
n . If some function f (Z) of the seed is leaked, then prg(Z) will not look random any more, as e.g. f (Z) could just output some bits of prg(Z). The following lemma from [19] states that if the range of f is not too big, then prg(Z) will still have high HILL-pseudoentropy. Results of this type (in a more general context than just PRGs) have been independently discovered by [47] , see Section 5 of [50] .
Lemma 4 (Pseudoentropy of a PRG, [19, 47] 
We will use the following technical lemma about some general random processes to show that the inputs X i and keys K i in the computation of S F are independent. Combining Lemmata 2, 3 and 4, we can prove Lemma 6 below, which states that the output F(K, X) of a wPRF has high HILL-pseudoentropy, even if K and X have high min-entropy (but are independent) and given some leakage f (K, X). We set t = n/ǫ prf in Lemma 2 and 3, moreover we need the domain {0, 1} n of F to be large enough, in particular, we will assume that (with ǫ prf as in the lemma below)
Note that the term on the right side drops exponentially in n, thus this restriction is a very weak one, and is e.g. satisfied for any ǫ prf ≥ n · 2 −n/3 and n ≥ 20.
κ and X ∈ {0, 1} n be independent where H ∞ (K) = κ−2λ and H ∞ (X) = n−2λ and let f : {0, 1} κ+n → {0, 1}
λ be any leakage function, then for large enough n (as just described) and λ ≤ log(ǫ Proof. We set ∆ := 2λ and ǫ = ǫ HILL := 2 −λ/2+1 , and require that λ ≤ 2 + log(ǫ 
whereŝ = s prg /2 λ+1 (n + κ). Now consider the wPRF F from the statement of the lemma, first we apply Lemma 2 with t = n/ǫ prf and q prf = t to get for a uniformly random X ′ (in the second step below we use eq.(19)).
Thus F is a (s prf ǫ prf /n, ǫ prf · 2 ∆+1 , 1) secure wPRF even if we use a non-uniform key K. Now we apply Lemma 3 (again with t = n/ǫ prf and using eq. (19) in the second step) δ s prf ǫ 2 prf /2n 2 (F(K, X) X ; U m X) ≤ ǫ prf · 2 2∆+3 + 2 ∆+1 · 2 · exp(−n 2 /32) ≤ ǫ prf · 2
2∆+4
Thus we can see F on input K, X as an (ǫ prg , s prg )-secure pseudorandom generator where s prg = s prf ǫ 2 prf /2n 2 and ǫ prg = ǫ prf · 2 2∆+4 (note that eq. (20) is still satisfied as in the statement of the lemma we require λ ≤ log(ǫ ) ≥ κ + n − 2λ Let us stress that here the new error ǫ i is ǫ ′ + ǫ i−1 , and not ǫ ′ + 2ǫ i−1 , as one would think because we must add an error term of ǫ i−1 for K i−1 and X i−1 respectively. Such a weaker bound would render the lemma useless, as then ǫ i would grow exponentially in i. The reason we only have to add ǫ i−1 , is that in round i − 1, F outputs (X i−1 , K i ), and it's this tuple that cannot be distinguished with advantage more than ǫ i−1 . Thus by adding an error ǫ i−1 for X i−1 in round i, we also account for K i to be used in the next round, and we won't have to add an extra error term there.
The bound on the security of S F as stated in Theorem 2 now follows by summing up the security decrease in each round as stated in the previous lemma. To apply the lemma, one must show that for each i, the K i and X i are independent given the view of the adversary, this follows from Lemma 5 by identifying A i (from the Lemma) with K 2(i−1) (as computed by S F ), identifying B i with K 2(i−1)+1 and V i with view i . In particular, after ℓ round, the error adds up to AdvInd(D, A, S, ℓ) ≤ ℓ · 2 −λ/2+3 .
Note that this is a bit strange, as the advantage decreases by increasing the leakage λ, but this is only due to the fact that we explicitly set the error parameters ǫ and ǫ HILL as functions of λ in the proof of Lemma 6 in order to keep the number of parameters down. Setting λ = log(ǫ −1 prf )/6 (note that this is the largest value allowed in the statement of Lemma 6), we get the bound as claimed in the theorem.
